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Value and Transaction Costs: 
Building Bridges Between the Economics of Property 
Rights and Strategic Management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We forge linkages between the economics of property rights (Coase, Demsetz, 
Cheung, Barzel) and strategic management.  Property rights to resources consist 
of the rights to consume, obtain income from, and alienate these resources.  
Transaction costs are the costs of exchanging, protecting and capturing property 
rights.  We clarify the key role of transaction costs with respect to understanding 
value creation and the limitations and opportunities of strategizing relative to 
competitive forces.   The economics of property rights identifies new sources of 
value creation (i.e., reducing the dissipation caused by transaction costs), and 
new types of resources (i.e., capture and protection capabilities), clarifies the role 
of contracting in the exercise of market power, and suggests that “strategizing” 
and “economizing” perspectives are related to a larger extent than is normally 
recognized.   Refutable propositions are derived.  
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Introduction 
This paper builds a bridge between mainstream strategic management theory (Porter 1980; 
Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993) and the economics of property rights (e.g., Coase 1960; Alchian 
1965; Barzel 1997; Foss and Foss 2002).  The relevance of such an exercise stems from the 
concepts and constructs, methods of analysis, and, in particular, insights with respect to 
understanding competitive strategy that it introduces to the strategic management field.   
 The relevant key concepts are those of property rights and transaction costs.  An 
agent’s, or, as we shall say, a player’s, ability to derive value from resources by use or 
exchange depends on the property rights that she holds to the relevant resources, property 
rights over resources consisting of the rights to use, consume, obtain income from, and 
alienate these resources.  In turn, the ability to derive value from a resource is backed up 
by the power to exclude others, whether by legal or private means (Alchian 1965; Barzel 
1997: 2).  Since exclusion (i.e., protection of rights) is costly, property rights are seldom 
absolute.  A key tenet of the economics of property rights is therefore that a player’s ability 
to derive value from a resource is never perfect, because virtually all property rights are 
insecure. Transaction costs are the resources that are expended on the exchange, 
protection, and capture of property rights (Cheung 1969).    
 We show in this paper that these notions about property rights promote a fresh 
conceptualization of competitive strategy as revolving around how the (transaction) costs 
of protecting and capturing property rights influence the value firms can create and 
appropriate. This conceptualization unifies property rights, transaction costs, value 
creation and appropriation, and competitive strategy.   
 We build up a theory about competitive strategy from the above notions and 
conceptualizations by combining them with specific assumptions about behavior.  We 
assume that all players seek to acquire, protect, capture, and allocate property rights so 
that the value of the resources to which these rights correspond is maximized. An 
implication is that the lower the costs of protecting property rights, the better the 
incentives to create value, because more exchanges can then be concluded than if property 
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rights were less secure. When property rights are costly to protect, other players may 
expend resources on capturing them.  In turn, this influences how much value players can 
appropriate in cooperative and competitive relations.  When it is costly to protect property 
rights, an implication is that firms may increase their value-creation and the share of value 
that they can appropriate by means of reducing the costs of protecting their rights, that is, 
raising other firms’ perceived costs of capture. For example, contracting and influencing 
expectations through signaling may be means to accomplish these goals. These ideas link 
property rights, transaction costs, value creation and appropriation, and competitive 
strategy on the theoretical level.   
 The present application of the economics of property rights allows us to contribute to 
the strategic management field in a number of ways.  Thus, we provide an understanding 
of the key role of transaction costs in understanding 1) value creation and 2) the 
limitations and opportunities of strategizing relative to competitive forces.  In particular, 
we develop the argument that transaction costs constrain the opportunities for 
successfully carrying out competitive strategies, such as price discrimination, predatory 
pricing, and other attempts to exercise strategies based on market power.  This is because 
the costs of contracting between the players in an industry crucially influence whether a 
firm can exercise market power in that industry.  An implication of this latter line of 
reasoning is that “economizing” and “strategizing” perspectives (Williamson 1994) in 
strategic management are not analytically opposed, and can to a certain extent be aligned.  
In sum, our contention is that a significant part of strategic management concerns 
problems and opportunities that only arise in a setting where transaction costs are 
positive, and that added insight in the theory and practice of strategic management will be 
gained from more explicitly considering these costs. 
 The design of the paper is as follows.  We begin by explaining the basics of the 
economics of property rights.  An important part of this section is a discussion of the zero 
transaction cost setting underlying the “Coase theorem”(Coase 1960). The purpose of this 
is to tease out the consequences for the understanding of competitive strategy of assuming 
that transaction costs are zero.  We argue that the scope left for competitive strategy in this 
 4
setting is very limited, and that this points to the importance of transaction costs with 
respect to understanding competitive strategy (“Key Definitions and Tenets of the Economics 
of Property Rights”).   Having thus laid the groundwork, we then develop a property rights 
approach to competitive strategy under the assumption that transaction costs are positive 
(“A Property Rights Framework for Competitive Strategy”), and then discuss extensions of this 
framework, notably implications for competitive advantage (“Implications and Extensions of 
the Framework: Competitive Strategy and Sustained Competitive Advantage”).  The framework 
complements existing approaches in mainstream strategy research (Porter 1980; Barney 
1991).    
Key Definitions and Tenets of the Economics of Property Rights 
Economics has for a long time been an important source of ideas for developing 
mainstream strategic management theory (Porter 1980, 1981; Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993), 
and we conform to this tradition by making use of the economics of property rights (e.g., 
Coase 1960; Alchian 1965; Demsetz 1967; Cheung 1969; Barzel 1994, 1997; Foss and Foss 
2001).  So far, property rights economics has only been explicitly applied to the strategic 
management field in very few papers (Foss and Foss 2000; Kim and Mahoney 2001). 
Related approaches with common antecedents with property rights economics, such as 
transaction cost economics and the economics of agency, have been much more 
extensively used.  Notions about property rights are present in analysis of the strategic 
implications of intellectual property issues (e.g., Liebeskind 1996; Teece 1987; Argyres and 
Liebeskind 1998).  However, the economics of property rights goes far beyond issues of 
intellectual property.  It is therefore appropriate to state the fundamentals of the 
economics of property rights, particularly as these relate to firm strategy issues.  Note that 
the ideas about property rights that we use are different from those used in the approach 
of Hart (1995) and his various associates, which is sometimes also called the ”property 
rights approach” (see Foss and Foss 2001).  Also note that our aim is not to be 
comprehensive in our presentation; only those aspects that are relevant to strategic 
management are discussed (see Eggertson 1990 for a comprehensive presentation of the 
 5
economics of property rights). Finally, an important simplifying assumption in the 
following is that we, like most others engaged in content research in strategic 
management, conceptualize the firm as a unitary actor. 
Unit of Analysis 
 The economics of property rights was founded on the recognition that transactions 
involve the exchange of property rights rather than the exchange of goods per se, a tenet 
that is conventionally ascribed to Coase (1960). The unit of analysis is the individual 
property right.  Property rights over resources consist of the rights to consume, obtain 
income from, and alienate these resources, and therefore influence the abilities to consume 
and obtain income from those resources.   The value of any resource is a direct, positive 
function of these abilities and therefore of the underlying property rights.  Thus, 
understanding the determinants of these abilities and property rights, notably how well 
protected property rights are, brings insights into resource value.   We briefly explain the 
connection between taking the property right as a unit of analysis and, as is conventional 
in much contemporary strategy research, taking the resource as the unit of analysis. 
 By a “resource” we mean anything that may be thought of as a potential advantage to 
a firm (Barney 1991).  Resources are often composed of a (large) number of different 
attributes.  For example, a PC may yield a number of different services (i.e., word-
processing, music playing, access to the internet, etc.).  More abstractly, the resource of a 
research team may produce a number of different services, including some that are of 
value to the firm and some that are of value only to the team (i.e., what economists call 
“on–the-job-consumption”).  As the last example suggests, property rights may be held 
with respect to individual attributes of a resource.     
 An implication is that resources may be thought of as bundles of property rights. A 
firm that acquires a resource also acquires a bundle of property rights to the attributes of 
the resource. However, it may control these property rights to varying degrees. For 
example, a firm that runs a fenced and guarded parking space has fuller control over the 
property rights to the attributes of the parking space than a supermarket that has an open 
access parking space. Usually, the costs to supermarkets of fencing and guarding parking 
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spaces exceed the benefits. However, suppose a large movie theater opens next to a 
supermarket.  In this situation, it may be profitable for the supermarket to protect its 
property rights to the parking space to a higher extent, that is, fence and guard the parking 
space so that non-customers (or non-payers) can be excluded.  Thus, the value of a 
resource depends not only on its use and its scarcity, but also on the costs of controlling 
the property rights that make up the resource.   These costs are transaction costs.  In other 
words, resource value is influenced by transaction costs.  Below we discuss these costs and 
how they relate to the capture and protection of property rights. 
Transaction Costs and the Capture and Protection of Property Rights  
 Property rights over resources influence a player’s ability to derive value from the 
attributes of a resource.   A host of factors determine ability, notably the uses to which a 
resource is deployed.  However, given a particular use of a resource, the ability to derive 
value from it depends only on the transaction costs that the holder faces with respect to 
protecting her property right against other players’ attempts to capture (some of) the right.  
In turn, transaction costs depend on the costs of using legal and/or private means of 
protection.  Thus, our definition of property rights is concerned with what players believe 
they control de facto, rather than what they are legally entitled to (Barzel 1994: 394).    
 Control over attributes of resources is seldom or never perfect, because protection 
costs are positive.  In turn, this implies that most property rights may be subject to capture 
attempts.  By “capture” we refer to resource-consuming activities of appropriating 
property rights from other players without compensating them.  For example, two parties 
to a transaction may bargain and agree on a price for a resource of a certain quality; 
however, the supplier may deliver a resource of a lower quality.  Such post-contractual 
opportunism on the part of the supplier amounts to capturing (some) property rights from 
the buyer.  This situation may arise when the supplier has lower (measurement) costs of 
detecting the true quality of the resource than the buyer.  Theft is another example of 
capture.  So is competition, perhaps most obviously such activities as emulation, copying, 
reverse engineering, etc., but also price, quality and technological competition.  All of 
these activities aim at capturing property rights without compensating the current holder.  
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Thus, the property rights held by a firm may be subject to capture attempts from all 
players in the industry, as well as from entrants and producers of substitute producers.   
 Given this definition of capture, we can now define “protection” in terms of capture 
as players’ resource-consuming activities that reduce others players’ possibilities of 
capturing property rights.  A host of activities can be understood in these terms, most 
obviously making use of the legal system as well as establishing private orderings 
(Williamson 1996). However, deterring entry (Tirole 1988), establishing isolating 
mechanisms that make it costly to imitate resources (Wernerfelt 1984; Rumelt 1987), and 
constructing contracts and governance structures (Williamson 1996) also represent 
attempts to protect property rights against other players’ capture. 
Expectations, Variability, and the Duality of Capture and Protection 
 As the above suggests, there is, in a certain sense, a duality between capture and 
protection activities (see also Furubotn 1991; Skaperdas 1992), a duality that is mediated 
by expectations.  Duality here refers to the basic assumption that all capture activity is 
based on expectations of how well property rights will be protected, and, conversely, all 
protection activities are based on expectations of the intensity and extent of capture (at any 
rate of protection).  Thus, optimizing players who wish to protect their property rights 
(capture property rights) will form expectations with respect to what other players’ will 
spend on capture (protection).  For example, franchise chains, such as McDonald’s, that 
own very valuable brand names, invest strongly in protecting their property rights to 
these resources, notably by building reputations for aggressively taking legal action 
against infringements of their brand names.  Such actions constrain (franchisees’) capture 
of brand name capital (e.g., by cheating on quality) because they influence the expectations 
of would-be capturers with respect to the costliness of capture.  Entry-games (Tirole 1988) 
further exemplify the duality of capture and protection.  In such games potential entrants 
and incumbents form expectations with respect to post-entry and pre-entry behavior, 
based on their knowledge of the payoffs in the game. The incumbent may, for example, 
influence the potential entrant’s expectations by means of investing in excess capacity. In 
the (subgame perfect) equilibrium, expectations are such that the entrant will decide to 
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stay out.  In this expectational equilibrium, the property rights of the incumbent to net 
value generated by his resources (i.e., his production capacity) become perfectly defined 
and protected.  This illustrates the more general point that property rights are not only 
defined by contracts and the law, but also emerge as a result of competitive activities.   
 The expectations that are formed with respect to other players’ capture (protection) of 
property rights need to take account of variability with respect to capture and protection.  
For example, would-be capturers have different costs of capture, and these costs may 
change because of technological change (e.g., advances in IT also produced computer 
crimes and Napster).  Given that information is costly, players form expectations with 
respect to aggregate properties of the populations of capturers and protectors, such as the 
mean and variances of the underlying distributions of their costs of capture and 
protection.  With little or no variability, forming correct estimates of these statistical 
moments may not require much information.  Players may easily form correct 
expectations (that coincide).  Even in this situation, capture will take place, because 
protectors rationally decide not to protect all property rights against all probable capture, 
thus accepting that some property rights are insecure. With variability, the informational 
demands for forming rational expectations are higher.  Information is costly, and different 
players may have different costs of acquiring and processing information.  Therefore, 
players will form different estimates of the relevant moments in the distributions of 
capture and protection costs.  Expectations will not coincide, and errors will take place (if 
not on the average).  For example, if firms compete for market share, those firms whose 
capture costs are overestimated by rival firms may have an advantage because rivals do 
not invest sufficiently in the contest over the market share.  
 In the stochastic framework with positive information costs sketched here, property 
rights are effectively insecure and may change because of strategizing.  Moreover, 
strategizing (i.e., capture and protection activities) is an ongoing process, because players 
act on aggregate information and may have divergent expectations.   This points to an 
intimate connection between competitive strategy and transaction costs (i.e., the costs of 
capture and protection).  In order to spell this out more clearly, it is useful to examine the 
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implications for competitive strategy of assuming a setting where transaction costs are 
zero.  Such a setting is supplied by the Coase theorem (Coase 1960). 
A Coasian Benchmark: Implications of Zero Transaction Costs  
 The Coase theorem is an important mental tool in economics, where it is used in a 
counterfactual manner. Thus, an improved understanding of phenomena such as the firm 
and the law (Coase 1988) may seemingly paradoxically be obtained by examining an 
extreme setting in which these phenomena would have no economic role, and then ask 
what must be added to this setting in order to explain their existence in the real world.  We 
argue that the same kind of thought experiment can be carried out with respect to strategic 
management.  
 A compact way of stating the Coase theorem is to say that in the absence of 
transaction costs, all the value that can conceivably be created from the exchange and use 
in production of the available resources in the economy will, in fact, be created.  An 
underlying assumption is that players have full information.  Therefore, there can be no 
(transaction) costs of bargaining and no costs of measuring the attributes of resources. If 
transaction costs are zero, property rights to (all attributes of) all resources can be defined 
and protected at zero cost, and the duality of protection and capture then implies that no 
capture will take place.  In turn, this means that the costs of exchanging (including 
bargaining over) property rights are zero, and that all rights will therefore be moved to 
their highest valued uses.  Therefore, total created value will be at its maximum value.   
 A further remarkable implication of the zero transaction cost assumption is that the 
creation of value may be thought of as a process that is independent of the process of 
appropriating created value.  Specifically, one may think of the parties to transactions as 
first agreeing to maximize the value that can be created from their resources, and 
afterwards split this value through a bargaining process in which each party’s property 
rights over the created value become defined through the prices and side-payments that 
emerge from bargaining (Milgrom and Roberts 1990).  In other words, value creation is 
entirely independent of value appropriation if transaction costs are zero.  
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 The zero transaction cost setting does not rule out firms implementing strategies and 
realizing competitive advantages.  As Coase (1960) notes, rents may be earned when the 
supply of input resources is not perfectly elastic, independently of whether transaction 
costs exist or not.  In other words, players that possess property rights to valuable 
resources in inelastic supply may realize a resource-based competitive advantage.  Since 
property rights are perfectly protected, this competitive advantage is sustainable. Thus, 
the rudiments of the resource-based view of sustainable competitive advantage (Barney 
1991; Peteraf 1993) are compatible with the zero transaction cost assumption.  
 However, strategic problems and opportunities are rather limited in this setting.  On 
the one hand, creating and appropriating value can never represent true problems, 
because these are costless processes. Notably, bargaining over created value consumes 
none of the created value.  On the other hand, there are few sources of competitive 
advantage left if transaction costs are zero.  Thus, firms cannot gain a competitive 
advantage by possessing superior organizational designs, supplier and buyer relations, 
organizing capabilities, culture, etc.  This is because zero transaction costs imply that any 
organizational arrangement is as good (i.e., efficient) as any other.  Moreover, firms cannot 
derive a profit from exercising market power, that is, restricting supply, because all 
inefficiencies based on the exploitation of market power will be traded away under the 
assumption of zero transaction costs.   This provides a first understanding of the central 
contention of this paper, namely that a significant part of the activity of strategic 
management only makes (economic) sense in a setting in which transaction costs are 
positive, and that understanding this part requires explicit consideration of transaction 
costs.  
Transaction Costs and Value  
 The introduction of transaction costs means that the remarkable properties of the 
Coase Theorem cease to hold. Created value will fall short of the maximum conceivable 
amount. This is because it becomes costly to ascertain the attributes of resources (Barzel 
1982), define property rights to attributes in contracts, and protect these property rights.  
These activities dissipate value relative to the Coasian ideal.  Since protection becomes a 
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costly activity, capture may take place (depending on the costliness of the capture 
activity).  Notably, bargaining and contract enforcement become costly so that the 
analytical separation between creating value and appropriating value breaks down.  
Ultimately, this is because, given positive transaction costs, property rights cease to be 
perfectly delineated and enforced.  Dissipation of value results (Barzel 1997), so that the 
parties share less value; in other words, transaction costs influence the net value that 
buyers as well as firms can appropriate.  In fact, value-creating transactions may not be 
carried out at all because of the threat of capture (e.g., Akerlof 1970; Hart 1995; Williamson 
1996). 
  Analytically, the presence of transaction costs means that it becomes more 
complicated to define what is meant by value creation (cf. Brandenburger and Stuart 
1996).  Given zero transaction costs, value creation may be defined unambiguously as the 
sum of producers’ and consumers’ surpluses.  However, the presence of transaction costs 
means, for example, that the reservation prices that enter into the calculation of 
consumers’ surplus should be net of transaction costs.  This is because buyers also face 
capture, incur costs of protecting their property rights, and may themselves capture (e.g., 
by downloading “free” music files from the Internet).  Transaction costs also influence the 
supply side, for example, because firms incur protection costs and engage in costly 
capture.  Thus, transaction costs influence virtually all costs and prices, so that consumers’ 
and producers’ surpluses are different when transaction costs are positive than they are 
under zero transaction costs.  The notion of “value creation” should therefore not be 
invoked without making provision for transaction costs.   
 Although this brings analytical complexity, placing transaction costs center stage also 
brings new insights.  Notably, it implies that value may be created by reducing transaction 
costs and the inefficiencies they cause.  For example, a few years ago the sale and profits of 
high-end television producer, Bang & Olufsen, came under pressure, because of burglars 
going specifically for B&O TV sets to an increasing extent.   Demand fell as a result of this.  
By installing start codes (as in cars) in the TV sets, B&O helped protect their customers’ 
property rights by decreasing their cost of protection.  B&O could undertake this 
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protection effort at a lower cost than customers.  Because of this cost saving, more value 
was created for the parties to share.  The overall principle goes much further than this. 
Thus, given positive transaction costs, contracts and institutions, such as governance 
structures, are important means to reduce transaction costs and the inefficiencies they 
cause. Because of the ubiquity and importance of contractual and governance choices, 
Williamson (1994) argues that “economizing is the best strategy.” In the next sections, we 
argue that the ramifications of transaction costs for strategic management go beyond the 
choice of governance structure. 
A Property Rights Framework for Competitive Strategy  
In this section, we develop an economics of property rights approach to competitive 
strategy. From this perspective, the aim of competitive strategy is to choose the mix of 
capture and protection activities that maximizes firms’ property rights to created value net 
of transaction costs.  We later compare this understanding with mainstream approaches to 
competitive strategy.  
Appropriated Value 
 We begin from the notion of property rights to a resource as the rights to consume, 
obtain income from, and alienate the attributes that are associated with the resource, and 
from the insight that the ability to derive value from those attributes depends on how 
secure rights are.  We assume that firms generally seek to maximize the value of property 
rights, net of the costs of capturing and protecting those property rights (i.e., transaction 
costs).  This formulation relates to the mainstream conceptualization of the central 
problem in competitive strategy, namely how to maximize firm-level appropriated net 
value by choosing the optimal combination of positioning, activities and resources; 
however, it stresses the importance of property rights and transaction costs in 
understanding the determinants of net value.  Existing theory in strategic management 
emphasizes that the value that firms appropriate depends on a host of factors (e.g., Porter 
1980; Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993; Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1996).  Because of its 
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emphasis on transaction costs as the costs of capture and protection of property rights, 
property rights economics adds to the understanding of these factors, while adding new 
ones.   
 In this perspective, and taking the firm as the level of analysis, the value that the focal 
firm appropriates is an outcome of the factors identified in Figure 1; that is, the capture 
that other players undertake towards the firm, the protection undertaken by the firm, the 
firm’s own capture of property rights, and, finally, bargaining between the firm and its 
various stakeholders.     
XXXXXXXX Insert Figure 1 here XXXXXXXX 
Many of the factors identified by existing strategic management theory can be related to 
this framework.  Thus, bargaining power (Porter 1980) and strategic factor market issues 
(Barney 1986) relate to “bargaining.” Factors such as internal rivalry and entry (Porter 
1980), including imitative competition (Dierickx and Cool 1989), etc. may be subsumed 
under “capture against the firm.” “Ex post barriers to competition” fall under 
“protection.”  Etc.   
 However, our interest here is in what the economics of property rights adds with 
respect to the understanding of competitive strategy.  Some of this added content relates 
to the notion of “dissipation,” that is, value is dissipated as a result of capture and 
protection relative to the Coasian benchmark (cf. above).  Dissipation is important for 
strategic management because it reduces the value that can be appropriated; conversely, 
by reducing dissipation, more value may be appropriated.  Other parts of the content that 
the economics of property rights adds to strategic management relate to contracting and 
expectations.  Contracting between the players in an industry is important because it 
defines property rights and therefore influences bargaining and competitive outcomes. 
Expectations are important, because these determine players’ capture and protection 
activities.   These ideas are further discussed in the following. 
Capture by the Firm 
 14
 The focal firm may add to its appropriated value by engaging in capture. A necessary 
condition for successful capture is that property rights are insecure, because other players’ 
optimal protection efforts leave some property rights unprotected (we discuss this in 
greater detail later).  However, unprotected property rights do not necessarily result in 
capture, since although it may be costly to protect property rights, it may also be costly to 
capture these.  Thus, capture costs must be sufficiently low.   Capture by the firm may take 
place in a number of forms, such as moral hazard, adverse selection, hold-up, and, of 
course, various competitive activities. Thus, capture may be undertaken against 
competitors, customers, suppliers, alliance parters, etc.  All forms of capture revolve 
around insecure property rights, the latter being insecure because of transaction costs, 
such as costs of drafting contracts (i.e., contracts become incomplete), costs of monitoring 
(which make moral hazard viable), measuring attributes (which induce adverse selection), 
and costs of protecting against entry and imitation (which reduce property rights to 
income streams from controlling certain market shares and resources).   
 Capture Against the Firm 
 Capture against the firm reduces the focal firm’s appropriated value for two reasons.  
First, there is the income transfer from the focal firm to capturers when the latter succeed 
in activities such as opportunistic hold-up, moral hazard, adverse selection, or imitative 
competition.  This is well described in the strategic management literature.  Second, 
overall value creation is impaired by capture activities (i.e., dissipation takes place).  This 
has been given less attention in the strategic management literature.  For example, when 
products differ in the quality dimension but are offered at a single price, buyers may 
capture by means of adversely sorting among the products in the hope of finding high 
quality items.  Such sorting dissipates value, both because of the customers’ cost of capture 
and because capture reduces the firm’s expected appropriable value. This leads it to 
reduce supply (Barzel 1982).  Duality of capture and protection suggests that a number of 
practices may be interpreted as an attempt by firms to increase the value they appropriate.  
For example, DeBeers only offers buyers pre-sorted diamonds and requires them to take 
the offer or cease being a DeBeers customer.  These practices have been interpreted as an 
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attempt to reduce capture by drastically increasing buyers’ cost of capture, thus reducing 
dissipation of value (Kenney and Klein 1983).   We turn to the issue of protection and its 
implications for value creation next. 
The Firms’ Protection Efforts 
 By the duality of capture and protection, protection is ultimately prompted by 
capture in the form of moral hazard, adverse selection, hold-up, and various competitive 
activities undertaken by rivals.  By the same token, protecting property rights is 
tantamount to raising would-be capturers’ costs of capture.  Existing strategic 
management research identifies a number of ways in which this may be done, particularly 
making resources harder to imitate (Dierickx and Cool 1989; Reed and DeFilippi 1990) and 
engaging in entry-deterrence (Tirole 1988; Shapiro 1989).   The economics of property 
rights add to this literature in a number of ways.  First, it explicitly recognizes that 
protection is never perfect because protection is a costly activity and that capture is 
therefore always a possibility.  Second, protection of property rights dissipates value so 
that more value can be realized if cost of protection can be reduced.  Third, different firms 
may have different comparative advantages with respect to protecting property rights. 
Fourth, the means of protecting property rights are not limited to making resources costly 
to imitate and engaging in entry-deterrence, but also include such practices as contracting, 
sorting and other means of reducing variations in the quality of products and services 
(whether supplied or purchased).  
 As emphasized in mainstream strategic management theory, protection increases 
appropriated value (Barney 1991), because a protecting firm can appropriate a larger share 
of created value.  However, there is also the effect that overall created value (i.e., 
appropriable value) is increased.  Consider trading relations.  Appropriable value may be 
increased by means of making property more secure through re-allocating ownership and 
the rights to residual incomestreams to assets (Hart 1995; Williamson 1996; Barzel 1997) 
and/or reducing quality uncertainty through investing in improving measurement 
technologies (Foss 1996) or sorting (Barzel 1982).  The focal firm will undertake such 
protection efforts when the increase in appropriable value translates into increases in 
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appropriated value.  Whether this will be the case depends on whether the firm has 
sufficient bargaining power. 
Bargaining  
 Bargaining is central in mainstream strategic management theory as an important 
determinant of how much value firms can appropriate (Porter 1980; Peteraf 1993; Nalebuff 
and Brandenburger 1996; Coff 1999). Variables such as size, outside options, impatience, 
etc. are identified as important determinants of bargaining power and therefore of how 
value is shared.  From the perspective of the economics of property rights, the outcome of 
a bargaining process is a delineation of property rights.  Relatedly, there are property 
rights determinants of bargaining power in the sense that the enforcement of property 
rights is of crucial importance for bargaining power. For example, the presence of sunk 
costs does not matter for bargaining outcomes if enforcement of contracts is perfect; only 
outside options matter.  Moreover, the economics of property rights points out that value 
is dissipated in the process of bargaining (unless information is symmetric) (Coase 1960).  
 Bargaining power is typically dealt with in static terms (e.g., Porter 1980), that is, 
although the use of bargaining power for strategic purposes is fully recognized, the 
building of bargaining power for these purposes is less recognized (but see Hart 1995; 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1996; Michaels 2000).  Building bargaining power falls neatly 
into the present framework.  Thus, bargaining power may be built in order to appropriate 
a larger share of created value in which case the building of bargaining power should be 
interpreted as capture.  Alternatively, bargaining power may be built in order to protect 
existing shares of created value, in which case the building of bargaining power should be 
interpreted as protection.  In any case, building bargaining power is a costly activity, 
because overall created value is diminished.  In sum, the economics of property rights 
points to a number of distinctive ways in which bargaining determines appropriated 
value.  
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Summing Up  
 The framework developed in this section provides an approach to understanding the 
forces that determine the value (net of transaction costs) of property rights controlled by 
the firm, that is, it provides insight into appropriated value.  It is consistent with key 
insights of strategic management theory.  Yet, it adds to existing theory, by  
1) stressing the costliness of capture and protection activities – which directs attention 
to tradeoffs that have been comparatively neglected in strategic management;  
2) directing attention to dissipation of value attendant on capture and protection – 
which directs attention to reducing dissipation as a source of value creation; and 
3) identifying sources of value appropriation that have been comparatively neglected 
in strategic management, such as reducing quality variation, incentive alignment. 
 The framework may be used for comparative purposes; thus, managers may use it to 
examine whether the firm controls the optimal bundle of property rights.   For example, 
the framework may be used to assess the capture and protection costs associated with 
using a resource in alternative uses, and therefore the appropriable value associated with 
such different uses.  This involves assessing important tradeoffs, notably between using 
resources for the purpose of protecting the focal firm’s own property rights or using them 
for the purpose of capturing other firms’ property rights.  In other words, the framework 
has strong implications for the firm’s overall resource allocation process. We next discuss 
implications and extensions of the framework. 
Implications and Extensions of the Framework: 
Competitive Strategy and Sustained Competitive Advantage 
Competitive Strategy as Contests over Insecure Property Rights 
 Mainstream strategic management theory conceptualizes competitive strategy as 
how to maximize firm-level appropriated value by choosing the optimal combination of 
positioning, activities and resources.  In the economics of property rights perspective the 
aim of competitive strategy is to choose the mix of capture and protection activities that 
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maximize firms’ property rights to created value net of transaction costs.  Though 
different, these two conceptualizations are nevertheless complementary.  In particular, the 
economics of property rights adds to the mainstream analysis of competitive strategy by 
stressing the role of the property rights structure for value creation and appropriation. The 
analysis of the Coase theorem setting showed that the scope for competitive strategy is 
limited when transaction costs are zero, because then property rights are completely 
defined and secure, including property rights to (infra-marginal) surpluses, that is, 
“consumers’ and producers’ surpluses.”  In the following, we examine, under the 
assumption that transaction costs are positive, how property rights to such surpluses 
become defined and protected as a result of competitive activities (i.e., contests over 
insecure property rights), and discuss how transaction costs influence windows of 
opportunity for competitive strategy.   We first offer an example of how reasoning may 
expand the understanding of a competitive strategy.  We focus on the dramatic case of 
“predatory pricing.”  
Predatory Pricing Strategies: Are Property Rights Insecure? 
         Consider a firm that contemplates whether to engage in the competitive strategy of 
predatory pricing, that is, holding price below marginal cost so that rivals are driven out 
of the market, and when this is accomplished, raising the price to the monopoly level.  
Such a predator hopes to capture rival firms’ surpluses, as well as at least parts of buyers’ 
(consumers’) and suppliers’ surpluses.  Since predatory pricing is illegal in most countries, 
the property rights that the predator may establish to these surpluses are highly insecure.  
This may deter his attempt to establish property rights to surpluses by means of predatory 
pricing.  However, other factors may hinder his predatory pricing strategy as well.   
 To see this, think of the predator as engaging with other players that have an actual 
(i.e., rivals, suppliers and buyers) or potential (producers of substitute products, potential 
entrants) stake in industry surplus in a contest over insecure property rights.  What will 
determine whether he succeeds in capturing and protecting rights to surpluses?  In the 
usual analysis, this depends on whether the predator can deter entry after he has driven 
his rivals out of the market and raised the price towards the monopoly level (Tirole 1988); 
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thus, successful deterrence protects the predator’s property rights to surpluses.   However, 
note that “prey” may resist capture prior to the predatory pricing strategy. Thus, potential 
preyed-upon firm(s) may expect predatory pricing strategies.  So may buyers and 
suppliers.  These groups of prey may benefit from entering into long-term supply 
contracts that will protect them against predation.  For example, contracts that stipulate 
the prevailing price as the one under which future transacting will take place will be 
sufficient to stall capture in the form of predatory pricing.   In fact, any contract that 
stipulates a price below the would-be predator’s expected monopoly price will have this 
effect.  In effect, a property rights structure to surpluses that favors the prey is defined by 
means of such contracting.   
 The property rights structure that will, in fact, be established depends on the 
expected contracting costs and benefits of protective contracting.  If the prey expect their 
contracting costs (i.e., costs of negotiating and enforcing contracts) to exceed their 
expected benefits from contracting (Demsetz 1967), they will refrain from entering into the 
contracts.  By the principle of duality of capture and protection, the prey’s expected 
benefits from engaging in a contest over surplus with the predator depend on the 
predator’s cost of capturing surplus, including his costs of protecting surplus, should he 
successfully capture.  Thus, if prey expect that the predator cannot sustain a monopoly 
position because of entry after monopolizing the market through predatory pricing (i.e., 
his costs of protection are very high), the benefits of contracting between prey will be low.  
On the other hand, if prey expect the predator to be able to deter entry, contracting 
becomes more attractive.   
 In terms of the framework outlined in Figure 1, the predator will be able to increase 
its appropriated value when 1) prey’s contracting costs are such that it is too costly for 
them to define property rights to the surpluses through contracting so that the predating 
firm can capture insecure property rights; 2) the predator’s property rights are well 
protected because ex post entry is too costly; 3) suppliers’ capture against the predator is 
costly, because the property rights established between the predator and its suppliers are 
well-defined and enforced at low cost (i.e., long-term, court enforceable contracts exist); 4) 
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buyers’ coordination costs are such that they will not be able to act as a coalition relative to 
the predator-turned-monopolist  thus, they cannot appropriate much of the surplus 
through bargaining; and 5) all appropriable value is not dissipated. In sum, predatory 
pricing strategies will succeed when prey’s contracting costs are high (i.e., condition 1) and 
the predator is not threatened by ex post entry (condition 2).  They will yield appropriated 
value when in addition conditions 3) to 5) are met.  A managerial implication of the 
example is that firms that wish to engage in pricing strategies relative to rivals (including, 
but not limited to, predatory pricing) should carefully examine the contractual structure in 
the relevant industry, because their strategic opportunities are influenced by this structure.  
In other words, opportunities for, and constraints on, strategizing depend on the costs of 
establishing and enforcing property rights.  Thus, the extent to which firms can, in 
actuality, exercise market power is dependent upon the property rights structure in the 
relevant industry.  We expand upon this idea in the following. 
Opportunities and Constraints in Strategies Based on Market Power: The Role of 
Property Rights 
 The reasoning in the above example can be generalized using the framework in 
Figure 1 to other situations in which firms seek to transfer value from buyers and/or 
competitors to themselves by exercising market power. The example illustrates how 
transaction costs, property rights, and the exercise of market power are connected.  As a 
further example of this reasoning, buyers and suppliers may enter into protective 
contracts when faced with the potential exercise of market power through mergers, price-
discrimination, product differentiation, entry deterrence, etc. Thus, buyers and/or 
suppliers may, in effect, eliminate the deterring effects of entry and exit barriers by 
“bribing” potential entrants to enter in the case of attempted monopolization.  While there 
is more to competitive strategy than the exercise of market power, a significant portion of 
competitive strategy revolves around this notion (Porter 1981).   We discuss this further in 
the following.   
 Any firm trying to assess its opportunities for the capture of surpluses by means of 
the exercise of market power must consider that ”… in anticipation of the potential of 
 21
becoming the victims of [the exercise of market power], people can take protective action 
to avoid the associated loss” (Barzel 1994: 407)  that is, (intended) capture gives rise to 
protection.   Incentives to undertake protection on the part of victims exist when entry and 
exit barriers are high, that is, market power is not kept at bay by potential entry.  Given 
such high barriers and if potential “victims” are sufficiently farsighted, they can anticipate 
their losses (if any) from strategies such as price-discrimination and merger strategies and 
“take protective action.”  The losses in question are not only the direct income transfers 
from victims to those firms that carry out strategies based on market power, but also the 
dissipation of wealth introduced by such strategies (i.e., some transactions are not carried 
out, wealth is spent on strategizing).  However, whether protective action can, in fact, be 
taken depends on the victims’ costs of protective contracting.   
 An important implication of this reasoning is that the opportunity for increasing 
appropriated value through the exercise of market power in an industry increases with the 
costs of protective contracting, that is, the costs to potential victims of defining and 
enforcing property rights to surpluses.  The costs of protective contracting include the 
costs of searching for contract partners, writing and bargaining over contracts, and 
enforcing contracts.  Many variables may potentially determine these costs, such as the 
number of potential contracting partners, (industry rivals and potential entrants), 
switching costs, the number of contingencies that the contract(s) must cover (i.e., writing 
costs), and the strength and availability of self-enforcement and third-party enforcement 
(i.e., enforcement costs).  There are no simple relations between these variables and 
contracting costs.  For example, while search costs may be low when there is only one 
potential contracting partner, bargaining costs may be high.   Moreover, all the variables 
arguably vary across industries.  For example, the number of contingencies that contracts 
cover depend on, for example, technological dynamism.  Even enforcement mechanisms 
differ; for example, some industries, such as those in which contractual incompleteness is 
prevalent, rely more on self-enforcement than others.  
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Raising Other Players’ Costs of Protection 
 An implication of the above is that it may pay for firms that wish to exploit market 
power to raise other players’ costs of protection, that is, to make it costly for them to enter 
into contracts with each other.  This complements the mainstream strategic management 
focus on ways in which firms can raise rivals’ costs of capture, notably by building entry 
and mobility barriers (Porter 1980) or by making imitation costly (Barney 1991).   
 Product differentiation and price discrimination may be ways of raising preys’ 
contracting costs, because these strategies essentially function as divide et impera strategies 
relative to attempts to build countervailing power.  They do so because they make it more 
costly for other players to organize and protect against the would-be monopolizer’s 
capture.  Another way that a would-be monopolizer may raise protection costs is to 
engage in frequent product upgrading. This can work as a means of raising the costs of 
contracting between players, because buyers entering into these contracts with rival 
suppliers in the hope of avoiding being the victims of monopolization will have to pay for 
this in terms of not having access to upgraded products.  The latter costs may overwhelm 
the former costs.   In this case, a technologically dominant firm may indeed exploit its 
market power. Also, the assembling and announcement of allies, as when Sun gathered 
allies in support of Java and took out full-page advertisements listing the companies 
behind the Java coalition (Shapiro and Varian, 1999), may serve the purpose of deterring 
the attempts of prey to protect against capture.  In other words, successful strategizing 
may proceed by means of raising the costs of contracting of other players 
(consumers/users, rivals) by means of product upgrading, product differentiation, or 
price discrimination. This would only seem to be necessary in industries where other 
players can make contract that deter attempts to exploit market power at low cost; if they 
could not, why would they engage in such resource consuming deterrence tactics? (Foss 
2003). 
Implications for Sustained Competitive Advantage 
 The key dependent variable in mainstream strategic management research is 
sustained competitive advantage.  A firm has a sustained competitive advantage when it 
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is able to appropriate that part of value creation that lies above normal returns in 
equilibrium (Porter 1985; Peteraf 1993; Barney 1991), that is, when it holds secure property 
rights to this income stream.  Extant theory provides a number of conditions that must be 
met before firms can gain sustained competitive advantage (idem).  Notably, the resource-
based view stresses that superior (i.e., valuable and rare) resources must also be costly to 
imitate and substitute if they are to give rise to sustained competitive advantage from cost- 
or differentiation-based strategies.  While these conditions are arguably necessary, they 
are not sufficient for sustained competitive advantage.  Thus, the economics of property 
rights points to more forces than those captured in the existing frameworks (Porter 1980; 
Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993) that may make property rights insecure.  Also, a central point in 
this paper is that dissipation may be an important part of the cost of strategies. The 
framework summarized in Figure 1 therefore adds complementary insights to the extant 
analysis of sustained competitive advantage.  These are briefly discussed in the following. 
 Complementary insights.   Recall that the basic unit of analysis in the economics of 
property rights is the property right to an attribute.  In this perspective, resources are 
bundles of property rights.  Resource owners protect property rights to the attributes of 
resources to a varying extent.  In the presence of transaction costs, an important factor that 
influences the extent to which property rights can be protected is the variability of the 
attributes of resources (Barzel 1982), because contracting over attributes that vary is costly.  
Capture in the form of moral hazard and adverse selection results.  Protecting against such 
capture by sorting goods, writing contracts, monitoring employees, etc. dissipates 
resources. Thus, a precise assessment of the rent-earning potential of a resource should 
incorporate the underlying variability of attributes, because rents can be eroded in more 
ways than are described in the existing strategic management frameworks, that is, capture 
against the firm (cf. Figure 1) goes beyond the forces identified in these frameworks.  
 To exemplify this reasoning, imagine that a hypothetical insurance company is 1) the 
first to market a particular kind of accident insurance arrangement, 2) the insurance 
arrangement is in heavy demand, 3) the insurance concept can be protected by legal 
means, and 4) factor markets can only bargain for a small part of the value created by the 
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new strategy, and 5) buyers (i.e., customers) have weak bargaining powers.  In other 
words, the insurance company would seem to implement “… a value creating strategy not 
simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitors and … these 
other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy” (Barney 1991: 102). Thus, it 
realizes sustained competitive advantage. However, this may not be the case.  Because of 
transaction costs, the price of insurance contracts cannot perfectly reflect the true accident 
risks of each individual who takes out insurance.  Given variation in risks, some 
customers, namely those with high accident risks, will capture property rights to 
compensation. “Adverse selection” results (Akerlof 1970; Barzel 1982).  It is conceivable 
that all of the rents from the new strategies will be eroded, first, through the adverse 
selection of customers, and, second, because of dissipation as the insurance firm 
undertakes protection in the form of costly segmenting of the customer base, so that 
insurance prices better reflect true risks.   
 To further illustrate the importance of taking account of variation (in the attributes of 
resources), consider the argument that a necessary condition for competitive advantage is 
that the value of a given resource is higher than its purchase or hire price (Barney 1986; 
Peteraf 1993).  Whereas the usual focus is on superior information about how to deploy the 
resource, the economics of property rights traces the difference between price and value to 
variation in the attributes of resources, which makes it costly to price all resources at their 
value.  Firms that have low costs of capture will be able to purchase resources (i.e., 
bundles of property rights over attributes, including the highly valued one) at prices 
below their value to the seller.  Such low costs of capture may be caused by low costs of 
searching for information about the attributes of resources.  In turn, low costs of searching 
may be caused by comparative advantages (i.e., superior efficiencies) in searching or in 
low opportunity costs of search.   This illustrates how treating capture by the firm in a 
property rights perspective refines the analysis of strategic factor markets by stressing that 
“superior information” needs to be gathered and that this is a costly activity.   
  Conditions for sustained competitive advantage.  The economics of property rights 
adds to extant perspectives on sustained competitive advantage. Two additions have been 
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given particular attention in the above.  First, it refines the analysis of capture, thus adding 
forces that influence appropriated value to the existing strategic management frameworks.  
Second, the economics of property rights suggests that dissipation must be considered, 
because appropriated value depends negatively on the costly protection that firms may 
have to carry out and because some value-creating transactions may not be carried out in 
the presence of capture (cf. Akerlof 1970).  
 These two points refine the analysis of the conditions for sustained competitive 
advantage.  Thus, the first point suggests that, as a general matter, there should be barriers 
to capture against the firm for sustained competitive advantage to obtain.  This is, of 
course, related to the extant emphasis on, for example, imitation, substitution, entry 
barriers, etc. However, making transaction costs explicit draww attention to capture 
activities that have not been traditionally considered.  There must be barriers to these 
activities as well, for sustained competitive advantage to obtain.  The second point is 
unique to this application of the economics of property rights.  It essentially says that the 
value that the focal firm can potentially appropriate cannot be eaten up by the costs of 
capture, protection and bargaining if it is to enjoy sustained competitive advantage.  
Although this may seem obvious when stated, there are virtually no references to 
dissipation in the mainstream strategic management literature (for an exception, see Porter 
1985: 9).    
  Heterogeneity, variability, and new resource categories. Like strategic management 
research, the economics of property rights stresses heterogeneity.  It is because of 
variability in resource attributes that transaction cost problems arise (e.g., measurement 
becomes costly).   However, because of its emphasis on the attributes of resources and the 
property rights to such attributes, the economics of property rights is able to identify and 
throw light on new sources of competitive advantage.  Thus, as has been argued, firms 
may have a competitive advantage from being better than the competition at limiting 
excess sorting, writing contracts, handling adverse selection problems, etc.  What may 
bring firms such competitive advantages are superior  capture and protection capabilities, 
that is, firms’ relative efficiencies in capturing and protecting property rights (Skaperdas 
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1994).  These constitute new types of resources (in addition to the traditional ones of 
human, organizational, financial, etc. resources).   
 In industries such as insurance and banking much competitive activity actually 
revolves around designing more efficient technologies for protecting against capture.   For 
example, banks adopt technologies that allow them to keep track of the number of times 
that customers use credit and debit cards, and price customers according to this.  They 
also invest huge amounts of money in new credit scoring systems (e.g., Experian) in the 
hope that these (supposedly) superior technologies will not only increase created value 
but also that they can appropriate large parts of this extra created value.  Such protection 
technologies/capabilities have not been given much consideration in strategic 
management research.  They are brought directly into focus in a property rights economics 
perspective. 
Concluding Comments 
We hope to have demonstrated in this paper that insights into transaction costs, focused 
by means of the economics of property rights, add significantly to the strategic 
management field.  On the substantive side, the economics of property rights analyzes 
new sources of value creation, because it directs attention to reducing dissipation as a 
source of value creation.  The economics of property rights brings new insights into 
constraints and opportunities for competitive strategy.  This adds to the familiar five 
forces analysis (Porter 1980).   The economics of property rights also yield complementary 
insights in the analysis of sustained competitive advantage by identifying new sources of 
rent erosion.   In particular, this adds to the resource-based view.  
 Methodologically, the economics of property rights aligns in important ways 
“economizing” perspectives, such as transaction cost economics, and “strategizing” 
perspectives that begins from the notion of market power (Williamson 1994). The 
economics of property rights suggests that this distinction may be overdrawn, since there 
is a close connection between the presence of transaction costs and the exploitation of 
market power.   Thus, we argued that a monopolizing strategy could be stalled by 
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protective contracting, if contracting (i.e. transaction) costs were sufficiently low.  We also 
pointed out that a monopolizing firm may adopt the strategy of raising the perceived 
contracting costs of victims. 
 With the exception of Foss and Foss (2000) and Kim and Mahoney (2001), the present 
paper represents the first application of the economics of property rights in strategic 
management research.  Therefore, much work remains to be done.   Theoretically, there is 
a need for formal modeling.  The economics of property rights draws attention to many 
variables and margins.  Formal modeling is necessary to fully clarify the potential and 
limits of this approach with respect to understanding strategic management.  There may 
also be a need for greater behavioral realism.  In our discussion and use of the economics 
of property rights we have assumed maximizing behavior throughout. This assumption is 
far from uncontroversial. There is considerable evidence that much real-world behavior 
suffers from various cognitive distortions (relative to the maximization ideal) (Bazerman 
2002).  Ultimately, these insights need to be factored into the economics of property rights.  
Finally, there is a strong need for empirical research, qualitative as well as quantitative.  
Qualitative could deal with our suggestion that firms may engage in protective 
contracting, and identify episodes from business history where this has taken place.  
Quantitative research may be directed towards explaining performance differences as a 
function of variability of the contracts, sorting systems, credit rationing systems, and other 
protection practices that firms may adopt.   
 With respect to the links between the property rights structure of an industry and 
competitive strategy, quantitative work may focus on the interaction between the 
contractual structure of an industry and competitive activity in order to understand how 
this structure influences strategic opportunities.  For example, such work may center on 
the transaction costs of engaging in preemptive contracting that blockades monopolizing 
attempts. A relevant measure would be the percentage fraction of organized 
consumers/customers of the whole consumer/customer base. Another relevant measure 
of the above transaction costs would be industry concentration (e.g., measured as the 
Herfindahl/Hirschman index). Time series of these may be constructed and regressed 
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against time series of some measure of monopolization attempts, for example, the number 
(and perhaps types) of antitrust cases in the relevant industry.  This is merely one 
example, among a large potential number.  We are confident that future work that applies 
the economics of property rights to strategic management will prove fruitful. 
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Figure 1: The Determinants of Appropriated Value
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